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Abstract 
Based on the inter-cultural relations model of John Berry, four different groups among Russian-speakers 
in Estonia were differentiated in the analysis of ‘Integration monitoring 2005’. The analysis reveals that 
both similarities and differences exist between the characteristics of these four groups and the groups 
in the typology of Berry (integration, assimilation, marginalisation, separation). The differences that 
emerged are related to the assimilation and integration strategies, which proved to be rather restrained 
for Russian-speakers in the current social and political context in Estonia. The analysis gives us ground 
to claim that the strong ethnic connotation of the current nation-state model in Estonia hinders finding 
a positive place in this country even for those Russian-speakers, who, in fact, would like to integrate. 
Keywords: Inter-cultural relations, acculturation strategies, integration policy, Estonia, 
                  Russian-speakers.
Introduction
The aim of this article is twofold. Empirically, the objective is to study the strategies of adaptation 
among Estonian Russians, particularly their attitudes towards a number of inter-ethnic issues in 
Estonia. Theoretically, the goal is to contribute to the discussion on the possible range of adaptation 
strategies utilised by immigrants and ethnic minorities. The conceptual idea behind the article holds 
that the original classification of John Berry, based on the research of acculturation and inter-cultural 
strategies (Berry 2008), reflects more universal strategies of inter-ethnic adaptation. We presume that 
utilising the ideal types presented in the model is helpful for better understanding of the strategies of 
inter-ethnic adaptation in this country.
To test the presumption, we used the data of the study ’Integration monitoring 2005’, which 
includes variables related to the acculturation framework of Berry on the one hand, and a number of 
additional variables related to the inter-ethnic issue in Estonia, like perceived discrimination, economic 
and political satisfaction, etc., on the other. We first constructed a five-factor model in order to reduce 
and generalise the chosen variables. On the basis of the obtained factor scores, cluster analysis was 
carried out, in order to distinguish four groups of Russian-speaking respondents, as is done in Berry’s 
model. The four groups obtained were analysed using five-factor scores, several other adaptation 
variables, as well as demographic background characteristics. Finally, the characteristics of the four 
groups were compared to the characteristics of the groups in Berry’s model, in order to determine the 
similarities and differences.
The article is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the main factors of the social 
and political context that have an impact on the adaptation of Estonian Russians. The second section 
presents an overview of the theoretical approaches to inter-group adaptation. The last section is 
devoted to the analysis of the data of ‘Integration Monitoring 2005’ and the interpretation of the 
results of the analyses along the inter-cultural relations model of Berry.
The adaptation context in Estonia
The adaptation context of Estonian Russians is characterised by a very specific social and political 
context, shaped both by the Soviet policies and the policies adopted since the regaining of independence 
in 1991. Before the Soviet occupation of 1940, according to the census of 1934, Estonians comprised 88%, 
Russians eight per cent and other national iti es four per cent of the population of Estonia. Russians in 
Estonia lived mainly in the border regions of Narva, Peipsi and Petseri. In 1945, the Soviet authori ties 
changed the border between Estonia and the Russian Federation. As a result, Estonia lost the border 
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regions inhabited by native Russians, which left Estonia a very homogeneous country where ethnic 
Estonians formed 97.3% of the populati on. However, in the period of 1945-1989 the population of 
Russian speakers in Estonia grew from 26,000 to 602,000, increasing from 2.7% to 39% (Vetik 1993). 
Such a dramatic demographic change is the result of the policies of the Soviet Union after WWII, 
which aimed to reconstruct Estonia both economically and socially as an integral part of the Soviet 
Union (Mettam & Williams 2001). 
In this context, the Soviet policies and institutions strongly supported the structural adaptation of 
Russian immigrants in Estonia. For example, a number of economic spheres and political institutions 
operated only in Russian, the migrants working mostly at all-Union enterprises had privileges in 
obtaining housing, and a separate Russian language education system was established in Estonia. 
As the result of such policies, the comparatively smooth structural adaptation of Russians in Estonia 
was accompanied by high segmentation between the Estonian language and Russian language 
communities. The Russian language migrants remained apart from the Estonian community culturally 
as well, representing the category of the so-called ‘Soviet people’ with no urgent need to learn the 
Estonian language or engage in interaction with local people. A very low level of interaction is one of 
the main features of the inter- ethnic adaptation context also in current Estonia - the extra vocational 
interaction networks in particular are centred without exception around one’s own ethnicity (Korts 
& Vihalemm 2008).
Since 1991, a number of new institutions aiming to continue the nation building processes along 
the lines of the pre-Soviet period were established. For example, the citizenship law that aims at legal 
continuity with the Estonian Republic of 1918-1940 was adopted by the Estonian Parliament in 1992. The 
law was exclusive in the sense that it defined only those residents and their descendants as citizens 
who were citizens of Estonia before Soviet occupation (including those of Russian ethnicity who were 
Estonian citizens before the Soviet occupation). People who migrated to Estonia during the Soviet era 
had to go through the naturalisation process. The law required two years of residence before a person 
was entitled to apply for citizenship, and an additional one year waiting period before the applicant 
could be naturalised. The law also included a loyalty oath and restricted certain categories of people 
from gaining citizenship (military officers, foreign intelligence, etc.). In addition, the law required 
knowledge of the Estonian language. Since a large proportion of the Russian speaking population 
neither had proficiency in the Estonian language when the citizenship law was passed, nor learned 
it later for various reasons, they either remained without citizenship or acquired Russian citizenship. 
By 2008, only about a half of Russian-speakers had acquired Estonian citizenship, and about the same 
proportion were either non-citizens or citizens of Russia (Nimmerfeldt 2008). 
The principle of legal continuity, as such, is merely a legal notion, but the psychological, social and 
political consequences of its implementation have proven to carry a very strong ethnic connotation. 
For example, previous research indicates that the emotional attachment of Russian-speakers to 
Estonia is related mainly to personal matters like family and home, which are located here, but not to 
the factors of the public sphere, like citizenship or state symbols (Vetik & Nimmerfeldt 2008). Thus, 
one of the negative results of the citizenship controversy is that the Estonian citizenship status is for 
Russian-speakers more of a pragmatic choice and a sort of social investment, rather than the measure 
of a person’s civic identity (Lauristin 2008). Furthermore, since this legal model became the basis of 
many new social and political institutions that strongly influence the adaptation of Estonian Russians, 
it gave rise to an emergence of ethnically based status hierarchies. Such hierarchies are particularly 
strong in the political sphere, since non-citizens are denied the right to run for public office, form 
political parties, and vote in national elections. 
Besides the citizenship issue, Estonia’s language and educational reforms have also contributed to 
the formation of a specific inter-ethnic adaptation context in Estonia, perceived by Estonian Russians 
as attempts at the ethnicisation of the public sphere. According to the Language Laws of 1989 and 
1995, the Estonian language is the only official state language in Estonia. Due to the political context 
in which these laws were adopted, many Estonian Russians regard the issuing of special rights given 
to the Estonian language as a limitation of their own rights. In addition, in many areas of Estonia 
that are mostly inhabited by the Russian speaking population, acquisition of the Estonian language 
at a sufficient level remains unrealistic, as many people lack the vital need for it, and this dominant 
Russian language context is not conducive to sustaining knowledge of the Estonian language. As a 
result, many Russian-speakers consider Estonia’s language policy as a form of forced acculturation or 
a vehicle for exclusion, aiming to create a unitary nation-state in Estonia. 
The same pattern is repeated regarding the educational reform, which started already in the 
beginning of the 1990s, but is still ongoing. According to the law of 2005, the language of instruction 
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in the Russian schools will be both Russian and Estonian. After several postponements, the transition 
to Estonian as one of the languages of instruction in upper secondary schools started in the academic 
year of 2007. The aim of the reform is that after a five year transition period, 60 % of all instruction in 
Russian upper secondary schools will be carried out in Estonian. The reform should help the Russian 
youth to achieve an equal starting position in the labour market compared to the Estonian youth, but 
in the political context of Estonia, many Russians perceive the reform as another attempt at forced 
acculturation. Thus, the school reform is not viewed in a constructive perspective and many Estonian 
Russians have a negative attitude towards it a priori (Saar 2008).
Thus, the inter-ethnic issue is strongly politicised in Estonia. A major external factor contributing to 
it is the permanent inter-state tension between Estonia and Russia during the last two decades (Vetik 
2009). It is important to note, in this context, that the two communities in Estonia are fundamentally 
divided by their attitudes towards the tensions. For many Estonians, Russia does not only embody the 
injustice of the past, but is also a continuous security threat. So the perceived imperialist ambitions 
of Russia are viewed as a source of the inter-ethnic tension by many Estonians. For most Estonian 
Russians, however, Russia is not only a source of their traditions and culture, but also the source of 
information through which meaning is given to their current everyday life (Vihalemm 2008). This split 
has sadly become an essential feature of Estonian party politics, as it is used for electoral gain, which 
further amplifies the divergence between the two communities (Vetik 2008). 
Briefly, due to both the legacy of the Soviet period and the way chosen by the Estonian state to 
overcome it, a very specific context for the adaptation of Estonian Russians has formed. The policies of 
the Estonian state, based on the ethnically connoted nation-state model (Piirimäe 2007), are perceived 
by many Russians as signalling ‘you are strangers and do not belong here’. Any protests against such 
policies are labelled by Estonians as anti-Estonian and representing the imperialist ambitions of Russia 
(Vetik 2009). In this context, the political mobilisation and participation of Estonian Russians has 
remained rather modest (Hallik 2005). 
Theoretical framework
The concept of intercultural strategies was introduced by Berry (1997, 2008) as an extension of the 
earlier concept of acculturation strategies (Berry 1980). This concept refers to the various ways that 
groups and individuals seek to acculturate and relate to each other as they carry out their lives when 
living in a society with two or more cultures. Knowledge of these variations has increased substantially 
in recent years (see Berry 2003, 2005), challenging the assumption that everyone would eventually 
assimilate and become absorbed into the dominant group (Gordon 1964). The notion of strategy is 
based on the view that at the cultural level the two groups in contact (whether dominant or non-
dominant) usually have some notions about what they are attempting to do (e.g. colonial policies). 
At the individual level, people will vary within their cultural group or ethnocultural community (e.g. 
on the basis of their educational or occupational background).  The more immediate outcomes of the 
acculturation process (including the behavioural changes and acculturative stress phenomena) are 
known to be a function, at least to some extent, of what people try to do during their acculturation; 
and the longer term outcomes (both psychological and sociocultural adaptations) often correspond to 
the strategic goals set by the groups of which they are members (Berry 1997, 2005).
Four strategies have been derived from two basic issues facing all peoples living interculturally. 
These issues are based on the distinction between orientations towards one’s own group, and 
those towards other groups (Berry 1980). This distinction is rendered as (i) a relative preference for 
maintaining one’s heritage culture and identity, and (ii) a relative preference for having contact with 
and participating in the larger society along with other ethnocultural groups. It has now been well 
demonstrated that these two dimensions are empirically, as well as conceptually, independent from 
each other (Ryder et al. 2000). This two dimensional formulation is presented in Figure 1.
These two issues can be responded to on attitudinal dimensions, shown as varying along bipolar 
dimensions, rather than merely as bald alternatives. Orientations to these issues intersect to define 
four acculturation strategies. These strategies carry different names, depending on which group (the 
dominant or non-dominant) is being considered. From the point of view of non-dominant ethnocultural 
groups (on the left of Figure 1), when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and 
seek daily interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when 
individuals place value on holding on to their original culture and at the same time wish to avoid 
interaction with others, then the Separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both 
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maintaining one’s original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the 
option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time 
seeking, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the evolving 
larger social network. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often 
for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for 
reasons of exclusion or discrimination) then Marginalisation is defined.
Figure 1. Intercultural Strategies in Ethnocultural Groups and the Larger Society.
It is obvious that non-dominant groups and their individual members do not have the freedom to 
choose how they want to acculturate or relate to other groups. When the dominant group enforces 
certain forms of acculturation or constrains the choices of non-dominant groups or individuals, then 
other terms need to be used. Thus, Integration can only be ‘freely’ chosen and successfully pursued 
by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards 
cultural diversity. Thus, mutual accommodation is required for Integration to be attained, involving 
the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples. This 
strategy requires non-dominant groups to adopt the basic values of the larger society, while at the 
same time the dominant group must be prepared to adapt national institutions (e.g. education, health, 
labour) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society (Berry 1974). As 
Estonia is part of the EU, it is important to notice that this meaning of the concept of integration was 
largely accepted by the EU (2005) in their set of ‘Common Basic Principles’ for integration in Europe.
These two basic issues were initially approached from the point of view of the non-dominant 
ethnocultural groups. However, since the original anthropological definition clearly established that 
both groups in contact would change and become acculturated, a third dimension was added: that of 
the powerful role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which mutual acculturation 
would take place (Berry 1974). The addition of this third dimension produces the right side of Figure 1. 
When sought by the dominant group, Assimilation is termed the Melting Pot. When Separation is 
forced by the dominant group, it is called Segregation. Marginalisation, when imposed by the dominant 
group, is Exclusion. Finally for Integration, when diversity is a widely accepted feature of the society as 
a whole, including by all the various ethnocultural groups, it is called Multiculturalism. 
With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their groups, 
and between non-dominant peoples and the larger society within which they are acculturating. The 
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acculturation ideologies and policies of the dominant group constitute an important element of 
intercultural research (see Berry, et al. 1977, Bourhis et al. 1997), while understanding the preferences 
of non-dominant peoples are a core feature in acculturation research, (Berry 2006, Berry et al. 1989). 
Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation preferences are common sources of 
difficulty for those experiencing acculturation.  For example, this can occur when individuals do not 
accept the main ideology of their society (when individuals oppose immigrant cultural maintenance 
in a society where multiculturalism is official national policy), or when immigrant children challenge 
the way of acculturating set out by their parents. Generally, when acculturation experiences cause 
problems for acculturating individuals, we observe the phenomenon of acculturative stress, with 
variations in levels of adaptation (Berry 2005). 
Data and methods 
The following analysis is based on a survey carried out in Estonia in 2005 - ‘Integration monitoring 
2005’, which was elaborated by the Tallinn University Institute of International and Social Studies (IISS) 
research group and carried out by the research company Saar Poll. This research was commissioned 
by the Integration Foundation of Estonia and such monitoring has been carried out regularly since 
2000. The goal of integration monitoring is to obtain a general overview about the accomplishment 
of the aims formulated in official integration documents along three strategic spheres: language-
communicative, legal-political and socio-economic. Academic interests have also been taken into 
account in developing the monitoring instrument.
1,000 individuals aged from 15 to 75 were interviewed for the ‘Integration monitoring 2005’, the 
sample being representative of Estonia’s population structure, including 659 Estonians as well as 
341 Russian speaking inhabitants of other nationalities (currently Russian-speakers form 32% of the 
population). The survey was carried out in the period January 20 – February 1, 2005, by the Saar Poll 
company. For defining the socio-demographic model for the sample, the data from the population 
register as of 01.01.2003 was used. Weighting of the sample along the variables of place of living, 
gender, age, nationality, region and education was carried out.
The Estonian Russian-speakers data from the survey is examined in the current paper. Among the 
data analysis methods used were factor analysis (extraction method: Principal Component Analysis, 
rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation), formation of summarised items with controlling 
for reliability through Cronbach’s alpha, cluster analysis K-means method for obtaining a determined 
amount of clusters, and dispersion analysis for discovering significant differences between the mean 
values of the factor characteristics.
From the ‘Integration monitoring 2005’ questionnaire, 36 items on interethnic relations were 
selected, answered by the Estonian Russian respondents. Among the selected questions were those 
related to the acculturation model of John Berry on the one hand, and a number of additional variables 
related to the inter-ethnic issue in Estonia like discrimination, economic and political satisfaction, 
etc., on the other (see Appendix 1). An additional criterion for selection was the demand for the 
dispersion of respective responses to be of sufficient scale for subsequent analysis. These variables 
were reduced and generalised using factor analysis. Based on the factor analysis results, a number of 
summarised items were formed, whereas only the items with bigger factor loadings where chosen 
from each factor. For most of the summarised items, the Cronbach´s alpha was higher than 0.6. All 
the summarised items were standardised and the missing values were substituted using the linear 
interpolation method. 
As a result of the factor analysis, the following summarised items were obtained (see Appendix 
1): Inequality of economical possibilities (scale 1), Inequality of career possibilities (2), Satisfaction 
with the economical situation (3), The position of Russians in Estonian society (4), Threat to Russian 
language and culture (5), Frustration from the lack of knowledge of the Russian language by Estonians 
(6), Contact with majority group (7), Ethnic self-esteem (8), Interest in Estonian Politics (9), Importance 
of  political activity (10), Evaluation of the integration policy (11), Satisfaction with the governing of 
the state (12)1.
1  The list of summarised items is presented in Appendix 1. The subheadings in the table describe the main theme 
of the summarised items (scales), each of the numbered and underlined sentences is the name of separate sum-
marised item under which separate questions (with order of answers) forming the item are given.
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Table 1. Factor Analysis, Rotated Component Matrix
Scale Factor 1
Contact and 
discrimination
Factor 2
Satisfaction 
with policies
Factor 3
Meaningfulness
of civic
engagement
Factor 4
Cultural Threat
Factor 5
Ethnic
self-esteem
Communalities
1 0.731 0.622
2 0.633 -0.331 0.584
3 0.725 0.570
4 -0.406 0.559 0.525
5 0.305 0.318 0.607 0.675
6 0.803 0.743
7 0.732 0.557
8 0.893 0.820
9 0.834 0.756
10 0.801 0.708
11 -0.339 0.707 0.667
12 0.488 -0.430 0.489
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation
In order to further reduce the number of factors, the second order factor analysis of the summarised 
items was carried out (see Table 1). The best fit was found in the five-factor model, which described 
64% of the variance (see Appendix 2). Based on the factor loadings that were obtained from the second 
factor analysis, we named the factor scores accordingly: 
Factor 1: Contact and discrimination (Inequality of economical possibilities, Inequality of career 
possibilities, Contact with majority group).  
Factor 2: Satisfaction with policies (Satisfaction with the economical situation, The position of Russians 
in Estonian society, Evaluation of the integration policy, Satisfaction with the governing of the state).
Factor 3: Meaningfulness of civic engagement (Interest in Estonian politics, Importance of political 
activity).
Factor 4: Cultural threat (Threat to Russian language and culture, Frustration from the lack of 
knowledge of the Russian language by the Estonians).
Factor 5: Ethnic self-esteem (Ethnic self-esteem).
Table 2. Cluster Analysis, Based on Five Factors
Factor scores Group I Group II Group III Group IV
Contact and discrimination -0.49*** -0.93*** 0.64** 0.54**
Satisfaction with policies 1.15*** -0.52** -0.17*** -0.43**
Meaningfulness of civic engagement -0.03*** -0.33*** 0.82*** -0.78***
Cultural threat -0.57** 0.65*** 0.25*** -0.43**
Ethnic self-esteem 0.27* 0.08* 0.34* -0.84***
Number of Cases 79 77 108 76
Percentage 23 23 32 22
* The asterisks show the number of groups that the given group significantly differs from when comparing their 
means (p<0,05)
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On the basis of the obtained factor scores, cluster analysis was carried out using the K-Means method. 
Since one goal of the article is to compare the characteristics of the groups acquired in the current 
analysis to the typical characteristics of the groups in the model of Berry, we formed four clusters to 
characterise respondent groups with different dispositions on the five factors (see results in Table 2).
Characteristics of the four groups
The first group constitutes a little less than a quarter of the sample (23%) and is best adapted to 
the Estonian society on the individual as well as group level, compared to the other groups. This 
group demonstrates the lowest mean in cultural threat2 and highest satisfaction with policies, as 
well as a lower than average perceived discrimination and higher than average ethnic self-esteem. 
Demographically, this group includes more men than on average, more younger people, more people 
with higher education, a smaller amount of retired and unemployed people, more people born in 
Estonia (71%), and more bearers of Estonian citizenship (73%) (see Appendix 3). Almost half of the 
group lives in the regions of Estonia that are mostly populated by Estonians (47%). Other items from 
the questionnaire that reflect adaptation (skills in the Estonian language, considering Estonia as 
one’s homeland, etc.; see Table 3) demonstrated high values in this group as well. Representatives of 
this group considered themselves to be more European, compared to other groups, thus, identifying 
themselves with an European orientation which is widespread among Estonians. It can be claimed 
that living in areas mostly inhabited by Estonians has enhanced contacts of this group with Estonians, 
as well as their acquisition of the Estonian language and culture. Since they are younger and better 
educated, this has also contributed to their better opportunities in acquiring the Estonian language 
and citizenship. 
Table 3. Additional adaptation indicators
Integration  Diffuse profile Separation Marginalisation
Thinks that Estonia joined the Soviet 
Union voluntarily in 1940, % 53 40 69 58
Able to communicate in Estonian well 
or at the medium level, % 68 43 36 21
Considers only Estonia as homeland, %
65 57 32 40
Considers oneself a European, % 75 66 55 46
Is interested in almost anything that 
goes on in Russia, % 38 39 62 24
Is willing to participate with Estonians 
in a leisure club/society , % 78 74 66 41
Agrees that it is important to actively 
take part in society life and give one’s 
input, %
60 47 57 32
Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and 
culture, % 50 60 82 51
The respondents of the second group also comprise 23% of the sample and are characterised by a 
relatively successful adaptation to the Estonian society as well: they demonstrate the lowest fear 
towards contacts with Estonians, as well as the lowest perceived discrimination, which in our context 
refers primarily to good individual socio-economic adaptation. At the same time, they are characterised 
by a higher perceived cultural threat and lowest satisfaction with government policies, which refers to 
adaptation problems and dissatisfaction on the group level. In addition, this group is defined by a low 
2  In the following text the word ‘mean’ is not continuously repeated, but it is important to keep in mind that the 
presented indicators are not absolute, but relative.  
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ethnic self-esteem and perceived meaningfulness of civic engagement. Regarding other adaptation 
indicators (Table 3), the group is characterised by higher Estonian patriotism (the lowest percentage 
who think Estonia joined Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940) and a stronger willingness to spend leisure 
time with Estonians (they are inclined to being members of leisure clubs/societies with Estonians). 
Demographically, this group includes more people in their early middle age, most of whom are born 
in Estonia (59%) and live in Tallinn (44%). These are people who regard Estonia as their homeland, but 
many of them have not acquired Estonian citizenship. Among them there are more people who are 
fluent in the Estonian language (43%) than those who are Estonian citizens (38%); this discrepancy can 
be regarded as a kind of protest against the particular nation-state model. One of the reasons for their 
low satisfaction with government policies is the fact that almost half of this group are stateless (43%). 
The third group is the largest one, constituting about a third of the sample (32%). This group is 
characterised by the highest dissatisfaction with their condition (the highest perceived discrimination 
as well as a fear of contacts with Estonians and a relatively high level of cultural threat), which 
refers to difficulties in adaptation on the individual and group level. At the same time, this group is 
defined by high ethnic self-esteem and psychological orientation towards Russia (many are interested 
in almost everything that is going on in Russia; few regard Estonia as their only homeland, and  most 
think that Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940), which have been channelled into a 
stronger orientation towards political activity. Demographically, this group contains older people, 
mostly with secondary education (70%), mostly born outside Estonia (59%), less than half are Estonian 
citizens (46%), and the majority of them live in Tallinn (56%). Thus, in this group are mostly the older 
people [non-Estonians] who were born outside of Estonia, who acquired a secondary education during 
the Soviet time, and do not regard Estonia as their homeland. The majority live in Tallinn, where 
Russian minded political attitudes as well as higher political activity (‘Interfront’ in the beginning of 
1990s, ‘Nochnoi Dozor’ currently) are more widespread among residents. 
Figure 2. Scores of Four Intercultural Strategy Groups on Five Factors
The fourth group comprises about one fifth of the sample (22%) and is remarkable for their lowest 
adaptation indicators on an individual, as well as group level: the lowest ethnic self-esteem and 
meaningfulness of civic engagement, very high perceived discrimination and fear of contacts with 
Estonians, as well as very low satisfaction with government policies. Demographically, this group 
includes more women than on average, older people, a greater amount of retired and unemployed 
people, more people with lower education (a third with just basic education), mostly born outside 
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Estonia (61%), mostly holders of Russian citizenship or stateless people, and almost half living in 
the Russian border region of Ida-Virumaa (47%). Therefore, in this group there are people who are 
older and have lower education, who were born outside of Estonia and live in areas that offer fewer 
opportunities for contact with Estonians, which is why they mostly have no Estonian language skills 
or the skills are insufficient. As a result, they can not acquire Estonian citizenship, which together 
with the low education level weakens their opportunities for finding employment and for structural 
integration to the Estonian society, enhancing social passivity and marginalisation. 
If we compare the groups that have adapted better (first and second), then we will find the highest 
mean differences in cultural threat and satisfaction with policies (see Figure 2). Based on this, we can 
presume that cultural threat has a significant influence on political satisfaction: in the first group 
the lower cultural threat is connected to higher political satisfaction and in the second group a high 
cultural threat is related to lower political satisfaction. The groups that have adapted less successfully 
(third and fourth) differ along three factor scores (meaningfulness of civic engagement, cultural 
threat, and ethnic self-esteem, see Figure 2). It can be presumed that in case of the third group, higher 
ethnic self-esteem that is accompanied by a higher sense of cultural threat applies more meaning to 
civic engagement, since they regard political actions to be more necessary than other groups do. Also, 
in this group there are considerably more people with Estonian citizenship, in contrast to the second 
or fourth groups, which partly explains their higher political activity, as compared to other groups. 
Their relatively higher orientation towards political activity is probably supported also by their higher 
orientation towards Russia (62% are interested in almost everything that goes on in Russia).
Discussion 
The characteristics of the four groups described in the previous section overlap to a large extent with 
what the intercultural strategies model suggests. On this basis, three out of the four described groups 
can be named along the model as follows: the first group can be regarded as mainly representing 
integration (with certain assimilation connotation), the third as separation and the fourth as 
marginalisation strategies of the model. The second group described above can be defined as having 
a diffuse profile (see also Berry et al. 2006), in which some characteristics suggest an integration 
orientation (attitudes towards contact), some suggest a separation orientation (low meaningfulness 
of civic engagement, citizenship behaviour), and some are reactions to forced acculturation practices 
of the state (high perceived cultural threat). 
The most characteristic factor score means that describe these four groups are shown in Figure 3. 
The intercultural relations model that the figure is based on holds that assimilation and integration 
groups are interested in contact with and participation in the larger society (the left side dimension 
of Figure 1), while separation and marginalisation groups are not interested in such relationships. 
Our data reveals that, in accordance with the framework, perceived discrimination and fear of 
contacts with Estonians are lower in the integration and diffuse groups than in the separation and 
marginalisation groups. Therefore, we suggest that in our analysis the contact and discrimination 
factor can be regarded as the key indicator of the orientation towards participation in the broader 
society. This central role for discrimination in distinguishing intercultural strategies has been found 
frequently in research with immigrants. For example, in the study of immigrant youth (Berry et 
al. 2006), discrimination was the single most powerful factor in distinguishing the integration and 
assimilation groups from the separation and marginalisation groups. In previous research in Estonia 
as well, discrimination has been found to distinguish between well and less well adapted groups of 
Estonian Russians (Kruusvall 2002).
Our analysis also indicates that integration and diffuse groups differ from separation and 
marginalisation groups in terms of the quantity of contacts. The same pattern is confirmed by the 
analyses of other adaptation indicators, which reveal for example, that there is a difference in the 
willingness of these four groups to participate in leisure time activities with Estonians (78% and 
74% versus 66% and 41% - see Figure 4). Thus, one can suppose that contacts with Estonians create 
preconditions for the achievement of a more equitable economic and social status for Estonian Russians, 
which decreases their perception of discrimination. The importance of contacts with members of the 
larger society has also been found in  research on immigrants. For example, in the immigrant youth 
study (Berry et al. 2006) peer contacts with members of the larger society were higher for those in the 
integration and assimilation groups than for those in the separation and marginalisation groups.
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Figure 3. Placement of Four Groups and Five Factors on the Two Dimensions of the Intercultural Strategies 
               Framework 
            MAINTENANCE OF CULTURE AND  IDENTITY
RELATIONSHIPS SOUGHT
WITH
ESTONIANS 
+ -
+ - contact and discrimination
- meaningfulness of civic engagement 
                                                  cultural 
                                                  threat +
                                                  political   
                                                  satisfaction –
 
DIFFUSE PROFILE
-  contact and discrimination
+ political satisfaction
                                         cultural 
                                         threat -
INTEGRATION (WITH
ASSIMILATION CONNOTATION)
- +  contact and discrimination
+ meaningfulness of civic engagement
                                                  cultural     
                                                  threat +
SEPARATION
+  contact and discrimination
-   political satisfaction   
-   ethnic self-esteem
                                         cultural 
                                         threat -
 
                             meaningfulness 
                   of civic engagement –
MARGINALISATION
The intercultural framework also presumes that integration and separation groups are interested 
in maintaining their ethnic heritage cultures and identities (the upper dimension of Figure 1), while 
assimilation and marginalisation groups are not interested in preserving their ethnic cultures. We 
suggest that in our analyses, the cultural threat factor can be regarded as the key indicator of the 
wish to preserve one’s ethnic culture. Our data reveals that cultural threat is higher in the diffuse and 
separation groups as compared to integration and marginalisation groups. The seemingly contradictory 
fact that cultural threat is low in the case of integration group refers to the assimilation connotation 
in their profile and can be explained by the social structure of this group – they tend to be younger, 
better educated, born in Estonia, have Estonian citizenship, etc., which all contribute to their better 
psychological adaptation compared to the other three groups. The same pattern is confirmed by the 
analysis of other adaptation indicators, which reveal that separation and diffuse groups are more 
willing to be bearers of their ethnicity and culture, compared to the integration and marginalisation 
groups (82% and 60% versus 50% and 51% - see Figure 4). This finding is consistent with the broad 
literature on the multiculturalism hypothesis (see Berry 2006 for a description). This hypothesis is that 
when a person is secure in their cultural identity, they will be open to engaging with those who are 
culturally different from themselves. However, when individuals feel threatened by others, they will 
react negatively to this threat and move toward an enhanced ethnic identity.
Data in Figure 5 confirms the trends presented in Figure 3 through the analysis of the two initial 
items in the research instrument that are directly related to the dimensions distinguished in the 
intercultural framework. Most (94%) representatives of the diffuse group are disturbed by the lack of 
knowledge of the Russian language among Estonians (including 33% who are very disturbed), which 
indicates high maintenance of one’s own culture and identity and, therefore, also a cultural threat. 
In the integration group, on the other hand, only 40% are disturbed by the lack of knowledge of the 
Russian language among Estonians, which indicates a low cultural threat. At the same time, both 
groups are inclined to go to work or study in a collective where the majority is Estonian; hence, they 
are characterised by a high willingness for contact with the majority group (and they do not perceive 
problems or discrimination in these contacts). In the separation and marginalisation groups, on the 
other hand, the proportion of those who are ready to go to work or study in a collective where the 
majority is Estonian is only 59% and 41% respectively, which is in accordance with the framework.
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Figure 4. Placement of Four Groups, and Two Questions on the Two Dimensions of the Intercultural Strategies 
                Framework
                    MAINTENANCE OF CULTURE AND IDENTITY
RELATIONSHIPS 
SOUGHT WITH 
ESTONIANS 
+ -
+ + Is willing to participate in leisure time 
activity with 
Estonians (74%)
+ Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and 
culture (60%)
DIFFUSE PROFILE
+ Is willing to participate in leisure time 
activity with Estonians (78%)  
- Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and 
culture (50%)
INTEGRATION (WITH 
ASSIMILATION CONNOTATION)
- - Is willing to participate in leisure time 
activity with Estonians (66%)
+ Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and 
culture (82%) 
SEPARATION
- Is willing to participate in leisure time 
activity with Estonians (41%)
- Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and 
culture (51%)
MARGINALISATION
For comparison, the figure also offers data on the Estonian respondents’ answers. Most Estonians are 
disturbed by the lack of knowledge of the Estonian language among Estonian Russians and only 56% 
of them are ready to go to work or study in a collective where the majority is Russian. The Russian 
language skills of Estonians themselves have decreased rapidly in recent decades and this is mostly 
true for the youth. For example, according to the ‘Integration monitoring 2005’, the proportion of 
youth that was able to interact in Russian had diminished from 44% in 1997 to 24% in 2005 in the 15-19 
age group, and in the 20-29 group respectively from 75% in 1997 to 54% in 2005 (Kruusvall 2006).
Comparing the additional adaptation indicators of the integration and marginalisation groups 
we see that the biggest difference lies in their Estonian language skills (able to communicate in 
Estonian: integration – 68%, marginalisation – 21%). Diffuse and separation groups mostly differ in 
their historical-political views on the relationship between Estonia and Russia (Thinks that Estonia 
joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940: separation – 69%, integration – 40%). 
Thus, one can argue that besides remarkable similarities there are also several important differences 
between what the intercultural relations model predicts and what can be found in the Estonian 
data. The first difference is that in Estonia we did not find a clear-cut assimilation category among 
Russian-speakers. This is not surprising at all and can be explained by historical and geographical 
factors (Estonian Russians used to be a dominating group during the Soviet period, Russia is a large 
and powerful neighbouring country to Estonia actively seeking to engage Estonian Russians) on the 
one hand, as well as by the high level of ethnic closure of the Estonian ethnic community (strong 
ethnic connotation of the nation-state model) on the other. However, the profiles of the integration 
and diffuse groups include certain characteristics of the assimilation category (low cultural threat, 
perceived discrimination).
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Figure 5. Distribution of Responses to Two Questions by Four Groups.
* Regarding the Estonians ‘knowledge of Estonian language’ and ‘majority is Russian’ was inquired.
There are certain differences between the model and reality also regarding the integration group, 
which represents 23% of the sample. This group is characterised by comparatively good adaptation as 
reflected in its lowest mean in cultural threat, highest satisfaction with policies, a lower than average 
perceived discrimination, higher than average ethnic self-esteem, higher rate of Estonian citizens, etc. 
However, contrary to what the model predicts, this group is not oriented towards participation in the 
larger society, as it does not regard civic engagement to be meaningful. One can argue that since the 
concept of integration entails a specific meaning for Estonian Russians, following this strategy is also 
rather problematic for them (similarly to the assimilation strategy), where civic engagement may be 
considered as a route to assimilation, rather than as an opportunity for advancement. The problem 
is that in the context of the specific nation-state concept in Estonia, as well as the regular tensions 
between Estonia and Russia which fuel the ethnic connotation of the concept, the representation of the 
specific political interests of Estonian Russians and the advancement of Russian culture are regarded 
rather suspiciously by the larger society (Rebane 2009). However, as this group is psychologically 
oriented towards Estonia and not Russia, then their interest in Estonian politics, as well as their desire 
to participate in it is not significant. 
The latter situation also holds regarding the diffuse group, which is characterised by the lowest 
fear towards the contacts with Estonians and lowest perceived discrimination, but also by the highest 
perceived cultural threat and the lowest satisfaction with policies. This group represents 23% of the 
Russian Estonians in the whole sample, and they may be seen as potential integrationists, because a 
number of their adaptation characteristics are close to the latter group and differ strongly from those 
of the separation and marginalisation groups (views on the contested history of Estonia, on Russia, 
Europe, etc.). Thus, one can argue that the Estonian Russians in the diffuse group who indicate their 
loyalty to the Estonian state in the survey lack such outlets for representing their specific cultural and 
political interests that are considered legitimate in the larger society. This discrepancy is channelled 
into very low level of meaningfulness of civic participation, considerably higher discontent with 
government policies compared to other groups, as well as into a kind of quiet protest in the form of 
not acquiring the Estonian citizenship (only 38% of them are Estonian citizens). 
The attitudes described for the separation (32%) and marginalisation (22%) groups resemble what 
has been found previously in research with the intercultural framework. The marginalisation group is 
lowest in ethnic self-esteem and very low in perceiving cultural threat, satisfaction with policies and 
meaningfulness of civic engagement. The separation group has the strongest ethnic self-esteem and 
wish to preserve one’s ethnic uniqueness; they are also critical towards the policies of the Estonian 
state, which in their account is exclusionist. The combination of high ethnic self-esteem and a critical 
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attitude towards the Estonian policies is channelled into psychological orientation towards Russia as 
well as political mobilisation: this group is more ready for political action to reach their goals. Thus, 
if the other three groups do not see a ‘window of opportunity’ to participate in the Estonian public 
sphere in a constructive manner, which would be perceived as legitimate by the larger society, the 
separation group is willing to take the risk and be labelled as ‘anti-Estonian’. 
Conclusions
The main conclusion of this study is that serious obstacles exist for the adaptation of Estonian 
Russians along both dimensions of the inter-cultural relations model – maintaining one’s cultural 
heritage and participation in the larger society. As a result of the high threat perception of Russia 
among Estonians, as well as the ethnic connotation of the nation-state model, the activity of Estonian 
Russians to formulate and achieve their own specific political and cultural goals (representation in 
the parliament, activities related to human rights, the issues of Russian language and education, etc.) 
have acquired the reputation of actions that are hostile towards the Estonian state. As a result, the 
option of integration, in the meaning of the inter-cultural framework, is restricted only to the socio-
economic sphere for Estonian Russians. In this sphere, achieving success is primarily dependent on 
the individuals themselves, since the ethnic factor does not pose a particular problem in the Estonian 
economy. However, the integration of Estonian Russians in the political or cultural spheres, in which 
successful adaptation depends to a large extent also on the attitudes of the larger community, is 
highly problematic. This is the reason why even the term ‘integration’ has a negative connotation 
among Estonian Russians (there are widespread claims like ‘opjat integrirujut’ – ‘again they are 
trying to integrate us’). The ethnically connoted nation-state model equates integration with forced 
acculturation - and as the majority of Estonian Russians do not wish to assimilate, integration for 
them means something to avoid.
The results of our analyses have an important policy implication. A large body of previous research 
confirms that aiming at parity and mutual accommodation would be beneficial not only for immigrants 
and ethnic minorities, but to the larger society as well (Berry 2008). Thus, we would like to conclude 
that it is in the national interest of Estonia to establish institutions aiming to decrease the ethnic 
connotation of the current nation-state model, in order to be able to build up a more equitable inter-
ethnic relationship in this country. In this way, those who now opt for integration or diffuse models 
could find a positive place in Estonia. Such a policy would be consistent also with the EU common 
basic principles on integration, which stipulate that ‘Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of 
mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States’ (EU Commission 2005).
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Appendix 1. Initial indicators and description of formation of summarized items
Scale
1.Inequality of 
economical 
possibilities
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.83
K39. Would 
you agree that 
non-Estonians 
with equal 
qualifications 
have equal 
possibilities 
with Estonians 
to achieve the 
following goals 
in Estonia?
D Achieving 
success in 
business
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
F Getting higher 
education
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
G Starting a 
business
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
H Getting equal 
salaries for 
equivalent jobs
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
I Getting social 
subsidies
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
2.Inequality 
of career 
possibilities
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.86
K39. Would 
you agree that 
non-Estonians 
with equal 
qualifications 
have equal 
possibilities 
with Estonians 
to achieve the 
following goals 
in Estonia?
A Getting a 
professional job
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
B Getting a job 
in a state 
institution
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
C Achieving a 
leading position
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
E Achieving 
success in 
politics
1
Mostly yes
2
Often Yes
3
Often No
4
Mostly No
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(Continued)
3.Satisfaction 
with the 
economical 
situation
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.63
K40. How 
satisfied are 
you with 
your present 
economical 
situation?
1
Not satisfied 
at all 
2
Not 
especially 
satisfied
3
Rather 
satisfied
4
Totally 
satisfied
K46. What have 
you done during 
the ast two 
years and what 
are you planning 
to do in the 
nearest future to 
manage your life 
better?
O Living more 
economically
1
Yes I have
2
No I haven’t 
but I will
3
No I haven’t 
and I will 
not
P Buying second 
hand clothes
1
Yes I have
2
No I haven’t 
but I will
3
No I haven’t 
and I will 
not
4.The position 
of Russians 
in Estonian 
society
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.59
K25. How do 
you evaluate 
the position of 
Estonians and 
non –Estonians 
in the Estonian 
society? 
1
Estonian 
noticeably 
higher
2
Estonian a 
little higher
3
Equal
4
Non-
Estonian a 
little higher
5
Non-
Estonian 
noticeably 
higher
KP26. Dou you 
consider the 
lifestyle/way 
of thinking of 
Estonians to be 
different from 
yours?
1
Very 
different
2
Rather 
different
3
Rather 
similar
4
Very similar
K57. Are the 
non-Estonians 
living in Estonia 
in a bigger risk 
of losing their 
jobs compared 
to Estonians?
1
Definitely
2
Probably yes
3
Probably not
4
Definitely 
not
(Continued)
Appendix 1. (Continued)
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5.Threat 
to Russian 
language and 
culture
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.42
K11 According 
to the present 
laws students 
of Russian high 
schools will 
learn 60% of 
the subjects in 
Estonian and 
40% in Russian 
as of the 
beginning of the 
year 2007. What 
is your opinion?
1
This is 
a good 
decision
2
I have 
doubts in 
the positive 
effects of this 
decision
KP35 Which of 
the following 
circumstances 
will most 
endanger the
Russians’ future 
in Estonia.
2 Vanishing of 
national culture 
and weakening 
of national 
feeling
1
Doesn’t 
endager
2
Still in 
danger
3
Endangers 
the most
12 Weakening of 
the importance 
of the Russian 
spoken language
1
Doesn’t 
endager
2
Still in 
danger
3
Endangers 
the most
6. Frustration 
from the lack 
of knowledge 
of the Russian 
language
KP10 How 
disturbed (or 
not disturbed) 
are you by 
the lack of 
knowledge of 
the Russian 
language among 
Estonians in 
Estonia?
1
Not at  all
2
A little
3
Very much
(Continued)
Appendix 1. (Continued)
Scale
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7.Contact with 
the majority 
group
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.42
KV16. The 
Estonian 
language is 
actively taught 
in school 
and outside 
of school. 
Children have 
friends among 
Estonians and 
they interact 
with Estonians: 
What can that 
result in?
D Children don’t 
properly know 
neither Estonian 
nor Russian
1
This will not 
happen
2
May happen
3
This will 
surely 
happen
F Children lose 
the connection 
with Russian 
culture
1
This will not 
happen
2
May happen
3
This will 
surely 
happen
KP20. Would 
you principally 
go to work 
or study in a 
collective where 
the majority is 
Estonian?
1
Yes, sure
2
Probably yes
3
Probably not
4
Definitely 
not
8.Ethnic 
self-esteem 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.71
K23. While 
answering 
the following 
questions we 
ask you to keep 
in mind your 
own ethnic 
group. Please 
say how you 
agree with them 
by choosing the 
corresponding 
number
A I often feel 
proud of being a 
member of my 
ethnic group
1
Don’t agree 
at all
2
Don’t agree
3
Can’t say
4
I agree
5
I totally 
agree
Appendix 1. (Continued)
Scale
(Continued)
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B I feel good as a 
member of my 
ethnic group
1
Don’t agree 
at all
2
Don’t agree
3
Can’t say
4
I agree
5
I totally 
agree
C My ethnic 
group is usually 
respected
1
Don’t agree 
at all
2
Don’t agree
3
Can’t say
4
I agree
5
I totally 
agree
9.Interest 
in Estonian 
politics 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.69
K68.Are you 
interested in the 
political events 
in Estonia?
1
I am not 
interested
2
I take 
interest only 
in some 
news
3
I take 
interest 
in almost 
everything
K71. What would 
an Estonian 
inhabitant in 
your opinion 
do to help the 
development of 
Estonian life in 
the best way? 
How important 
in your opinion 
is to … 
C Take part in 
elections
1
Not 
important 
at all
2
Important
3
Important
4
Very 
important
F Be informed of 
the Estonian 
politics
1
Not 
important 
at all
2
Important
3
Important
4
Very 
important
10.Importance 
of political 
activity
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.79
K71. What could 
an Estonian 
inhabitant in 
your opinion 
do to help the 
development of 
Estonian life in 
the best way? 
How important 
in your opinion 
is to…
    
Being a member 
of some party
1
Not 
important 
at all
2
Important
3
Important
4
Very 
important
Appendix 1. (Continued)
Scale
(Continued)
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Participating 
in voluntary 
organisations 
(for example 
nature 
protection, 
preservation 
of antiquities, 
charitable 
organisation, 
trade unions)
1
Not 
important 
at all
2
Important
3
Important
4
Very
important
11.Evaluation 
of the 
integration 
politics
Cronbach’s 
alpha 0.74
K32A. How 
successful has 
the integration 
of non-Estonians 
been in Estonia 
(the whole 
country)?
1
Totally un-
successful
2
Rather un-
successful
3
Rather 
successful
4
Very 
successful
K32B. How 
successful has 
the integration 
in Estonia 
been in your 
hometown/ 
county
1
Totally un-
successful
2
Rather un-
successful
3
Rather 
successful
4
Very 
successful
K66. How do 
you evaluate 
the present 
citizenship 
politics?
1
Too unfair 
for non-
Estonians
2
Normal, 
corresponds 
with the 
international 
demands
3
Too mild, 
harms the 
interests 
of Estonian 
nationality
12.Satisfaction 
with the 
governing of 
the state
K73.How 
satisfied are 
you with the 
governing of the 
Estonian state?
1
Not satisfied 
at all
2
Not 
especially 
satisfied
3
Mostly 
satisfied
4
Very 
satisfied
Appendix 1. (Continued)
Scale
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Appendix 2. Description of the results of second order factor analysis
Component Initial Eigenvalues % of Variance
after Rotation
Cumulative %
after Rotation
1 2.726 16.5 16.5
2 1.697 15.0 31.5
3 1.271 13.0 44.5
4 1.100 10.7 55.2
5 0.923 9.1 64.3
6 0.817
7 0.740
8 0.706
9 0.637
10 0.526
11 0.436
12 0.422
Appendix 3. The four groups by background items
Name of the group Integration Diffuse Separation Marginalisation
% of total (N=340) 23 23 32 22
Men (%) 61 44 45 40
Age
Mean age 36 41 46 45
Dominant age group 15-39 (62%) 20-49 (64%) 40-74 (60%) 40-74 (60%)
Inactive in the labour 
market
Students, retired 16% students 15% retired,
11% students
9% unemployed
24% retired,
13% students
24% retired,
12% unemployed
Education
Basic education % 26 26 17 33
Secondary education % 48 55 70 56
Higher education % 26 19 13 11
Born in Estonia % 77 59 41 39
Citizenship
Estonian citizens % 73 38 46 26
Stateless % 17 43 27 36
Russian citizens % 9 15 26 38
Place of residence
Tallinn % 29 44 56 39
Ida-Virumaa county  % 24 29 24 47
Other regions % 47 27 20 14
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